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WAGES AND INTERNATIONAL RENT SHARING
IN MULTINATIONAL FIRMS
John W. Budd, Jozef Konings, and Matthew J. Slaughter*
Abstract—We use a unique firm-level panel of multinational parents and
their foreign affiliates to analyze whether profits are shared across borders
within multinational firms. Affiliate wages are estimated to respond to
both affiliate and parent profitability. The elasticity of affiliate wages to
parent profits per worker is approximately 0.03, which can explain over
20% of observed variation in affiliate wages. These results reveal a
previously ignored aspect of rent sharing. They also reveal an important
micro-level linkage with potential macro-level implications. International
rent sharing can transmit economic conditions across countries, and can
thereby provide an implicit risk-sharing mechanism.
I. Introduction
THE economic implications of increased globalizationhave been widely conjectured and researched. One
prominent concern has been how foreign competition, trade
protection, and foreign ownership affect the level and dis-
tribution of wages.1 Largely overlooked, however, has been
the issue of whether international linkages condition how
firms share profits with their workers.
A large literature has found that economic rents are often
shared with workers: profits and wages move together.2
With the exception of Budd and Slaughter (2004), however,
this rent-sharing literature has an explicitly domestic focus:
industry, firm, or establishment wages in a specific country
are regressed on profit measures for operations in that same
country. Yet with increased globalization, this implicitly
closed-economy perspective may miss important interna-
tional aspects of wage setting.
Consider, for example, the United Auto Workers. This
U.S. labor union agreed to major concessions in the early
1980s to help save the then-U.S.-owned Chrysler. More
recently, however, the UAW has reportedly been unwilling
to grant concessions because while the U.S. operation is
struggling financially, its German parent Daimler-Chrysler
is profitable.3 As an example of international rent sharing as
an explicit compensation strategy of multinational firms, in
1989 PepsiCo implemented a global employee stock own-
ership plan in which all employees worldwide were granted
shares of stock equivalent to 10% of their pay. Numerous
other companies have implemented similar strategies (Ir-
win, 1998).
These examples all demonstrate how cross-border flows
of capital, labor, goods, and information may exert strong
influences on the nature of profit sharing between firms and
workers. Budd and Slaughter (2004) consider whether
wages in one country may depend on profit conditions
outside of that country. Empirically, they found that union
wage contracts in Canadian manufacturing industries de-
pend not just on Canadian industry profits but also on U.S.
industry profits—and also that the nature of this profit
sharing depends on the nationality of the firm and union.
This paper builds on this theme of international rent
sharing by examining whether profits are shared across
borders within multinational firms. We do this using a rich
firm-level panel data set on multinationals with parents and
affiliates operating in Europe. This panel we assembled
from the Amadeus Database, which reports detailed finan-
cial and operational data for both parents and affiliates in
multinationals.4 The panel spans 1993 through 1998, with a
total of 865 parents and 1,919 foreign affiliates. With this
panel we can ask whether affiliate wages vary not just with
affiliate profits but also with parent profits, and similarly
whether parent wages vary not just with parent profits but
also with affiliate profits.
Our main empirical finding is that parents share profits
with majority-owned foreign affiliates. For affiliates owned
at least 50% by the controlling parent, foreign-affiliate
wages are correlated with parent profits per worker. This
correlation is both statistically and economically significant,
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1 Foreign ownership has been studied by Aitken, Harrison, and Lipsey
(1996) and Feliciano and Lipsey (1999); trade protection by Gaston and
Trefler (1995) and Haskel and Slaughter (2003); and foreign competition
by Borjas and Ramey (1995) and Freeman and Katz (1991). These are
representative examples, as the trade-and-wages literature has grown very
large. Many representative studies can be found in the volumes of Abowd
and Freeman (1991) and Feenstra (2000).
2 Analyses of interindustry wage differentials (e.g., Katz & Summers,
1989) revealed positive correlation between these differentials and indus-
try profitability. A number of subsequent studies, whether using industry
wages and profits (Blanchflower, Oswald, & Sanfey, 1996), union contract
wages with company profits (Abowd & Lemieux, 1993; Currie & Mc-
Connell, 1992; Svejnar, 1986), union contract wages with industry profits
(Christofides & Oswald, 1992; Budd & Slaughter, 2004), or company
wages with company profits (Hildreth & Oswald, 1997), all find that
wages depend on ability to pay.
3 The December 18, 2000 issue of Business Week reported, “[Chrysler
Group President Dieter Zetsche is] not likely to get much of a hearing
from UAW President Stephen P. Yokich. After winning the richest contract
terms in years in 1999, union members have little reason to start giving
money back. That’s in part because, despite Chrysler’s deepening prob-
lems—it’s expected to lose some $1 billion in the fourth quarter—the
German parent remains exceedingly profitable,” More recently, a similar
cross-border wage dispute has arisen in the multinational steel producer
Corus. The February 12, 2002 edition of The Times reported, “Corus, the
Anglo-Dutch steel maker, could face industrial action in a clash with
unions for imposing a pay freeze in the U.K. while increasing salaries of
Dutch workers. . . . A spokesman for the [British] union said, ‘We all work
for the same company, and we should all get the same deal.’ ”
4 In other contexts, Budina, Garretsen, and de Jong (2000) and Konings,
Van Cayseele, and Warzynski (2001) use this same data source. It is
available from Bureau van Dijck Electronic Publishing.
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and appears across a range of specification and estimation
choices addressing various measurement and endogeneity
issues. The degree of multinational ownership appears to
condition the degree of intrafirm profit sharing, with many
specifications indicating parents share profits only with
majority-owned affiliates, and more strongly with fully
owned affiliates. Our central estimates indicate that a dou-
bling of parent profitability raises affiliate wages by some-
where between 1% and 5%. Affiliate wages are also posi-
tively correlated with affiliate profits per worker, consistent
with the closed-economy perspective of previous rent-
sharing studies. The same is true of parent wages and parent
profits per worker; however, we find no evidence that parent
wages are correlated with affiliate profits per worker.
For a number of reasons, we consider this explicitly
international focus on profit sharing to be an important
innovation on earlier research. First, within the rent-sharing
literature it broadens the understanding of how firms relate
to workers. Budd and Slaughter’s (2004) cross-border focus
was limited to unionized wage negotiations in manufactur-
ing for a single country using industry-level profit measures.
Our panel extends their focus along many important dimen-
sions—many parent and affiliate countries, firms in all
industries, wages for all employees—and therefore takes a
much broader look at the relevance of international profit
sharing. The need to examine profit sharing in an interna-
tional context is underscored by rising foreign direct invest-
ment, which has been a central aspect of globalization in
recent years. Indeed, it has been reported that by the end of
our sample period, in Europe nearly 20% of all manufac-
turing employees worked in foreign-owned affiliates (Barba
et al., 2002).5
Second, our paper extends the research on globalization
and labor markets. Many studies have found that establish-
ments owned by multinational firms pay higher wages than
do domestically owned establishments, even controlling for
a wide range of worker and/or plant characteristics such as
worker occupation and plant capital intensity.6 This “multi-
national” wage premium is sometimes seen as a puzzle. But
if multinationals are, on average, more profitable than
domestic firms, then international rent sharing with mul-
tinationals could explain this wage premium. Within the
globalization-and-wages literature, other studies have ex-
amined whether multinationals alter the mix of activities
within parent and host countries.7 One point of contrast is
that much of the empirical work in this literature has
followed from the perfectly competitive Heckscher-Ohlin
trade model in which all sectors earn zero profits and all
workers earn their marginal revenue products. Our focus
on profit sharing extends this literature to consider im-
portant noncompetitive wage issues.8
Finally, our findings on international rent sharing carry
implications for the international macro literature on cross-
country movements in macro aggregates. In international
macro and real-business-cycle models, the standard mech-
anism by which national income shocks are transmitted and
smoothed across countries is by trading risk in international
capital markets (e.g., Stockman & Tesar, 1995). However,
many researchers have documented that the extent of inter-
national asset diversification is less than the standard mod-
els predict (Lewis, 1999; Obstfeld & Rogoff, 2001). Our
finding of international rent sharing in multinational firms
provides a micro-level linkage, very different from risk
sharing in international financial markets, which is an im-
plicit risk-sharing mechanism that can also transmit eco-
nomic conditions across countries.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II motivates
the empirical analysis with a discussion of the underlying
theory of profit sharing, and with an extension to the
multinational context. It then discusses our empirical frame-
work. Section III presents a description of the data, and
section IV the empirical results. Section V concludes.
II. Theoretical Background and Empirical Framework
A. Theoretical Background
Baily (1974) and Azariadis (1975) developed implicit-
contract models in which wages provide insurance against
demand shocks for risk-averse workers [see Rosen (1985)
for a survey]. Blanchflower et al. (1996) showed that if
these models are generalized to allow firms to be risk-
averse, then wages will be positively correlated with profits.
We extend this idea to multinational firms, which by defi-
nition operate in multiple countries.
Consider a multinational firm that operates in a parent
country p and an affiliate country a. Without loss of gen-
erality, assume that demand shocks  have a distribution
function g() that affect both countries equally, so that
profits  are defined as
  p  a  fnp  fna  wpnp  wana,
where w is the wage, n is employment, f is the production
function, and superscripts indicate parent or affiliate. The
5 UNCTAD (2000) reports that from 1979 to 1999, the ratio of world
FDI stock to world gross domestic product rose from 5% to 16%, and the
ratio of world FDI inflows to global gross domestic capital formation rose
from 2% to 14%. One consequence is that an increasing share of country’s
output is accounted for by foreign affiliates of multinational firms. The
foreign-affiliate share of world production is now 15% in manufacturing
and other tradables (Lipsey, Blomstrom, & Ramstetter, 1998).
6 For example, Howenstine and Zeile (1994) and Doms and Jensen
(1998) document these wage differentials among U.S. manufacturing
plants. Globerman, Ries, and Vertinsky (1994) present similar evidence
for Canada; Aitken et al. (1996), for Mexico and Venezuela.
7 Examples here include Konings and Murphy (2001) and Slaughter
(2000).
8 Our noncompetitive approach is closer to studies such as Borjas and
Ramey (1995), who investigate whether import competition squeezes
rents paid to less-skilled U.S. workers in imperfectly competitive indus-
tries, and Gaston and Trefler (1995), who examine the effect of U.S. tariffs
on industry wage premia.
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firm maximizes over wages and the employment utility
function v:
maximize  vgd (1)
subject to satisfying the minimum-utility constraints of its
employees:
 npuwp  1  npubpgd  u p, (2)
 nauwa  1  naubagd  u a, (3)
where u is the workers’ utility function, b is some
exogenous alternative (such as an unemployment benefit), n
is normalized to represent the probability of employment
relative to unemployment, and u is a minimum utility level.
To see cross-border profit sharing within this multina-
tional firm, consider affiliate wages. The first-order condi-
tion derived from differentiating equation (1) with respect to
wa is
vp  a 	auwa 0, (4)
where 	a is the Lagrange multiplier for equation (3) in the
constrained maximization problem. Ignoring corner solu-
tions, equation (4) implies that 	a 
 0 and defines an
implicit wage function for the affiliate wage.9
Differentiating (4) with respect to p yields
wa
p

vp  a
	auwa
. (5)
If the firm is risk-neutral, then this derivative equals 0 and
wages do not respond to firm profitability. But if both firms
and workers are risk-averse, then both v and u are
concave (and thus their second derivatives positive), and the
derivative in equation (5) is positive: affiliate wages respond
to parent profits as a form of risk sharing.10 By similar logic,
it can be shown that parent wages can vary with affiliate
profitability. Thus, within multinational firms cross-border
rent sharing can stem from implicit contracts between risk-
averse firms and workers.11
Profit sharing is also predicted by other models. One is
union bargaining over the firm’s economic rents. Bargaining
over parent as well as affiliate profits by unions representing
affiliate employees is a straightforward extension in a Nash
bargaining framework (Budd & Slaughter, 2004). Alterna-
tively, employee bargaining power need not stem from
unionization: in Lindbeck and Snower’s (1988) insider-
outsider model, current employees (insiders) derive the
power to extract economic rents from the employer via their
ability not to cooperate with new employees if they are
hired at a lower wage. This framework can yield interna-
tional rent sharing if insiders at an affiliate use their power
to extract parent as well as affiliate profits. Finally, interna-
tional rent sharing can also result from models of fairness in
which not sharing parent profits is perceived to be somehow
unjust (e.g., Blanchflower et al., 1996), or from models of
corporate strategy in which multinationals share parent
profits with affiliate workers to generate positive goodwill,
or even prevent government seizure, in the affiliate country.
B. Empirical Framework
Equation (5), or similar predictions from these other
models, suggests the following regression equation for em-
pirical analysis using panel data on affiliate wages:
wat  1
at
nat
 2
pt
npt
 3Zat  εat, (6)
where subscripts a, p, and t index affiliates, parents, and
time t; w is wages;  is profits; n is employment; Z is a set
of other regressors that can vary by affiliate, time, country,
and/or industry;  is an error term we discuss below; and the
’s are parameters to be estimated. Our innovation is to
consider the role of profitability outside the country where
wages are paid; that is, we are interested in estimating not
just 1 but in particular 2 as well. Equation (6) forms the
basis of our empirical analysis, with an analogous equation
for parent wages. We next address some important specifi-
cation, measurement, and endogeneity issues.
Important specification issues include how to indicate
profitability and what controls to include as Zat regressors.
It is standard in the rent-sharing literature to normalize
profitability in per-worker terms, a method which we follow
9 In this simple form, the model does not prevent a corner solution in
which the firm chooses to conduct all of its production in the country with
the lower minimum utility level. We believe it is reasonable to consider
the interior-solution cases with production in both countries. These cases
can result from plausible reasons, including sunk fixed capital investment
in each country, a desire to maintain entry to multiple markets, or access
to materials and other primary factors. These cases also accord with the
data set for our empirical analysis.
10 Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993) support the plausibility of risk-averse
firms; see also Dufey and Srinivasulu (1983). Examples of models with
risk-averse firms include Hart (1983) for implicit contracts and Goldberg
and Kolstad (1995) for multinational production decisions.
11 This result, of course, depends on the firm’s utility function v(p, a)
being a nonseparable function of both p and a. If the firm is risk-averse
but v(p, a) is separable, then the model predicts domestic but not
international rent sharing. Also, the assumption that the demand shock 
affects domestic and foreign production equally is simply to keep the
model straightforward. The key prediction of interest in equation (5) stems
from v(p, a), not the functional form of . We note that equation (5)
permits other risk possibilities, such as risk-loving workers and/or firms.
The case of risk aversion for both parties is standard, with substantial
theoretical and empirical support (see footnote 10). We also note that our
analysis will not consider affiliate employment, as opposed to wages as
shown in equation (5). That issue lies beyond the scope of this paper.
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here. In Zat we include a full set of unobservable affiliate
fixed effects. These allow for unobserved time-invariant
affiliate heterogeneity that influences wages: worker quality,
firm technology, or outside wage options. We also include a
full set of time effects. These allow for unobserved hetero-
geneity over time common to all affiliates, such as skill-
biased technological change. In Zat we also experiment with
affiliate time-varying measures of capital stock per worker
and R&D expenditures per worker, as directly observable
wage controls. We also try a full set of country-year effects,
to allow for national influences such as unemployment rates
and benefits, and of industry-year effects, to allow for
industry influences such as bargaining institutions. Our
baseline estimates will be for equation (6) using a standard
fixed-effects estimator.
There may be issues of endogeneity and measurement
that stem from the use of contemporaneous profits in equa-
tion (6). If wage outcomes affect profitability, then the use
of current-period wages and profits can bias estimates in the
fixed-effects regression. In terms of measurement, as dis-
cussed below, affiliate wages and affiliate profits are con-
structed using some of the same quantities, such as the total
wage bill and employment. Measurement error in these
quantities can introduce spurious correlation between the
dependent and independent variables in equation (6). Note,
however, that we are particularly interested in the relation-
ship between affiliate wages and parent profits. These two
quantities are constructed independently. Thus, although
affiliate wages and affiliate profits may be affected by
measurement error, this is not the case for affiliate wages
and parent profits. Accordingly, there is less reason to
expect spurious correlation between affiliate wages and
parent profits because of measurement issues.12
To address these potential endogeneity and measurement
issues, consider a first-differenced version of equation (6):
wat  1atnat  2ptnpt  3Zat  εat. (7)
First-differencing controls for affiliate fixed effects, and if
there is no serial correlation, then lagged profits are not
correlated with the differenced error term and are therefore
valid instruments for current profits. Lack of serial correla-
tion provides a moment restriction, so that equation (7) can
be estimated using the generalized method of moments
(GMM) (Arellano & Bond, 1991). Relative to conventional
instrumental variables estimators, this moment restriction
provides additional instruments, so this GMM estimator is
more efficient (Arellano & Bond, 1991). For example, for
1998 profits in equation (7), valid instruments are the level
of profits in 1996 and earlier years, because lagged profit
levels are not correlated with the differenced error term
between 1997 and 1998. As the panel progresses, an in-
creasing number of instruments can be used, which in-
creases the efficiency of the estimates.
To test the validity of these instruments we use a Sargan
test of overidentifying restrictions, which asymptotically
has a 2 distribution. Because the model is estimated in first
differences, the equation will be characterized by the pres-
ence of first-order serial correlation. But the validity of the
GMM estimator relies on the moment restriction stemming
from the absence of second-order serial correlation. It is
therefore important to test for second-order serial correla-
tion, and we report Arellano and Bond’s (1991) test, which
asymptotically has a N(0, 1) distribution. Because the
model is estimated in first differences and because lagged
values (dated at least t  2 and before) of the endogenous
variables are used, we need to observe affiliates for at least
three consecutive time periods. In the empirical results,
then, our sample sizes are smaller when we estimate equa-
tion (7) via GMM than when we estimate equation (6) as a
standard fixed-effects regression.
III. Data Description and Sample Statistics
Our data are derived from a commercial database named
Amadeus, collected by the consultancy Bureau van Dijck.
The database consists of company accounts reported to
national statistical offices for European companies for
which at least one of the following criteria is satisfied: total
turnover or assets of at least $12 million, or total employ-
ment of at least 150. The database is organized by country
with records for firms within each country. The company
records include information on whether the company has an
ownership stake in a foreign affiliate, and identify affiliates
by name and a unique identification number. It is therefore
possible to determine if a firm operates as part of a multi-
national group and to link parent firms to foreign affiliates
anywhere in Europe via the unique identifiers.
Financial and operational information is available for 1993
through 1998, and we retrieve all companies for which uncon-
solidated accounts were available separately for the parent and
its affiliates. Due to variation in national reporting require-
ments, all companies in some countries—in particular Great
Britain, Greece, and Finland—lack basic information (e.g.,
wage bills) that are essential for our analysis. Otherwise, we
include companies in the data set simply on the basis of data
availability and the ability to link parents with foreign affili-
ates. Companies in all industries are included.
The available ownership information refers to the year
1998, and we assume that the parent-affiliate ownership
structure for 1998 applies to the earlier years. Although we
cannot follow ownership changes during the sample period,
we do not believe that this is a serious problem. To the
extent that we are potentially including a few affiliates that
were not affiliated in earlier years, we are introducing
measurement error that may bias our results towards 0.
Matching parent companies to foreign affiliates yields an
unbalanced panel of 865 parents and 1,919 affiliates over 6
12 This is an important measurement difference between our estimation
and the domestic rent-sharing literature.
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years. Table 1 shows the country distribution of parents and
affiliates in our panel, where each parent has an average of
2.2 affiliates. The parents are concentrated in western Eu-
rope, with significant numbers in France, Germany, Italy,
and Belgium. Smaller numbers of parent firms are located in
Austria, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain.
Affiliates are found in these countries as well as the eastern
and central European countries of Bulgaria, the Czech
Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. The pattern of
parent and affiliate locations looks broadly consistent with
typical patterns of multinational investment. For example,
high-wage Germany has relatively few affiliates, whereas
low-wage Spain has a significant number of affiliates, which
is consistent with “vertical” foreign direct investment (FDI)
to take advantage of lower labor costs. But a significant
amount of multinational investment is “horizontal” FDI in
which companies seek to serve foreign markets without
incurring trade costs via exporting. Table 1 also shows this
type of investment: for example, France has even more
affiliates than Spain.
Summary statistics for the data are presented in table 2.
There are 5,758 affiliate-year observations, which repre-
sents the 1,919 affiliates appearing in the panel an average
of approximately three times each. The key variables in
table 2 are wages and profits. Again, with the unconsoli-
dated accounts in Amadeus we can calculate wages and
profits separately for parents and affiliates. Wages are con-
structed as the reported wage bill divided by total number of
employees, which is standard for corporate data in the
profit-sharing literature (e.g., Hildreth & Oswald, 1997).
The wage bill includes wage and salary payments to em-
ployees as well as mandated employer contributions to
government social-insurance funds. As discussed below, we
also try log-level wages. Profits are constructed as value
added (i.e., sales minus materials costs) minus the wage bill,
all divided by total employment. This profit measure fol-
lows that of several other studies (e.g., Blanchflower et al.,
1996), and corresponds to the economic concept of rents
available for sharing with workers. We constructed the
capital-to-labor ratio as reported capital stock divided by
employment, and constructed R&D intensity as reported
R&D expenditures divided by employment. All monetary
measures are reported in Amadeus in home currencies; we
converted to dollars using International Monetary Fund
annual exchange rates.
The average wage for affiliates is $46,367, and for par-
ents is $55,868. Unfortunately, Amadeus reports no skill
indicators (e.g., occupation or educational attainment). But
this average-wage difference accords with standard trade
models of multinational firms in which parents concentrate
on skill-intensive production of firm-wide knowledge assets
(e.g., Carr, Markusen, & Maskus, 2001). Per-employee
profits are higher, on average, in the affiliates than in their
parents. Note that wages exhibit significantly less variability
than profits. The standard deviations for wages are only
30% to 40% of the mean, whereas the standard deviations
for profits are 2.8 to 4.4 times greater than the mean.
Moreover, both wages and profits are more variable in the
affiliates than in their parents. The correlation between
parent and affiliate wages is 0.25, whereas the correlation
between parent and affiliate profits is 0.05. The higher wage
correlation than profit correlation is suggestive of cross-
border rent sharing.
TABLE 1.—COUNTRY DISTRIBUTION OF PARENTS AND AFFILIATES
Affiliates
(1)
Parents
(2)
Austria 60 16
Belgium 208 148
Bulgaria 5 0
Czech Republic 4 0
France 592 271
Germany 64 215
Hungary 17 0
Italy 284 155
Luxembourg 24 3
Netherlands 21 5
Poland 33 0
Portugal 64 2
Romania 33 0
Spain 510 50
Total 1,919 865
Sample of European multinational parents and affiliates, 1993 through 1998, taken from Amadeus
database. See text for details.
TABLE 2.—MULTINATIONAL PARENTS AND AFFILIATES: SUMMARY STATISTICS
Variable Mean (1) Standard Deviation (2)
Average wage, affiliates [ wage bill  employment] 46.367 18.439
Average wage, parents [ wage bill  employment] 55.868 16.710
Profits per employee, affiliates [ (sales  materials cost  wage bill)  employment] 126.471 553.324
Profits per employee, parents [ (sales  materials cost  wage bill)  employment] 108.203 307.223
Indicator of majority-owned affiliate 0.919 0.272
Indicator of fully owned affiliate 0.322 0.467
Capital-labor ratio, affiliates [ capital stock bill  employment] 64.113 450.507
R&D intensity, affiliates [ R&D expenditures  employment] 8.067 50.622
Sales, affiliates 110,826.2 432,223.5
Sales, parents 1,376,961 3,379,460
Employment, affiliates 382.868 1,701.407
Employment, parents 4,411.355 8,323.11
Summary statistics are calculated for the full sample of 5,758 affiliates. These cover all affiliates with sufficient data for the full 6 years of the sample, 1993 through 1998. All monetary variables are denominated
in thousands of U.S. dollars. Employment is number of bodies. The two categorical variables are coded 1 if the ownership criterion is met and 0 otherwise. See text for details.
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Over 90% of the observations involve affiliates that are
majority-owned by the parents, and 32% are fully owned.13
The last four rows of table 2 reveal that parents are,
unsurprisingly, much larger than affiliates in terms of both
sales and employment. Also, as the Amadeus data are
limited to medium and large firms, average affiliate employ-
ment is 382.
IV. Estimation Results for Fixed-Effects
and GMM Estimates
A. Benchmark Results for Affiliate Wages
Table 3 reports our fixed-effects estimates of equation (6),
where in columns 1 and 2 Zat includes a full set of affiliate
and year fixed effects using two-digit NACE industries. As
discussed earlier, these control for many time-constant de-
terminants of wages (e.g., worker quality) and for time
effects (e.g., technological change), respectively. For all
fixed-effects specification, each column reports for each
regressor a coefficient estimate and its standard error (robust
to allowing for affiliates sharing the same parent). For each
profits regressor, we also report the implied wage-profits
elasticity (the coefficient estimate multiplied by that sam-
ple’s mean ratio of profits to wages).
Before discussing the results in table 3, we should point
out that we first estimated equation (6) on a sample of both
minority- and majority-owned affiliates. Here the standard
closed-economy rent-sharing result was evident, with affil-
iate wages significantly positively correlated with affiliate
profits. But we found no significant correlation of affiliate
wages with parent profits. That said, it seems reasonable to
expect international rent sharing to be stronger for majority
and fully owned affiliates. In our section II discussion of
within-firm cross-border risk sharing, parents with only a
minority ownership stake may play a negligible role in the
multinational firm being considered. Alternatively, it may be
that only the majority-owning parent engages in bargaining
with affiliate workers. In this case the profitability of
minority-owning parents may be irrelevant. Or in situations
of fairness, in firms with multiple minority owners the
identity of these minority parents may simply be unknown
to affiliate workers during wage discussions. For all these
reasons, it seems plausible to expect any profit sharing from
parents to affiliates to be stronger the higher is the owner-
ship stake in the affiliate.
Column 1 reports fixed-effects results for a sample of
only majority-owned affiliates (which includes those fully
owned). The affiliate-profit coefficient is virtually un-
changed from the unreported minority- and majority-owned
results, but there is now strong statistical support for inter-
national rent sharing within multinational firms. The parent-
profit coefficient is 0.0033, with a t-statistic of 2.71 and a
p-value of 0.007. The implied elasticity is 0.0073. Evidence
of both standard within-country rent sharing and interna-
tional rent sharing is even stronger in column 2, in which the
sample is further restricted to fully owned affiliates. Despite
a 65% reduction in the full-sample size, both the affiliate
and parent profits estimates are now larger and more pre-
cisely estimated.
Columns 3 and 4 repeat the analyses of columns 1 and
2, but expand the set of Zat controls from just affiliate and
year effects to also include affiliate capital intensity,
affiliate R&D intensity, and year-country effects. The
qualitative pattern of profit sharing is the same, although
the statistical significance of the international rent shar-
ing effect is weaker.14
13 There are a large number of missing values for the ownership shares
in Amadeus. For U.S.-headquartered multinationals in recent years, ap-
proximately 80% of affiliates are majority-owned, so in our data we
assume that an affiliate is majority-owned if its ownership share is
missing. The results are robust to excluding these observations from the
majority-owned analysis. We define fully owned affiliates as those owned
at least 99% by the parent; this definition does not include affiliates with
missing ownership-share information.
14 There may be concern that the profits-wages correlation reflects
unobserved worker characteristics, if high-quality workers tend to both
TABLE 3.—PROFIT SHARING WITH AFFILIATE WAGES: FIXED-EFFECTS ESTIMATES
Majority-Owned Affiliates (1) Fully Owned Affiliates (2) Majority-Owned Affiliates (3) Fully Owned Affiliates (4)
Affiliate profits 0.0031 0.0138 0.0030 0.0127
(0.0008) (0.0023) (0.0008) (0.0024)
[Implied wage-profit elasticity] [0.0085] [0.0310] [0.0082] [0.0291]
Parent profits 0.0033 0.0060 0.0023 0.0032
(0.0012) (0.0020) (0.0013) (0.0020)
[Implied wage-profit elasticity] [0.0073] [0.0124] [0.0048] [0.0066]
Affiliate capital intensity 0.0005 0.0379
(0.0003) (0.0067)
Affiliate R&D intensity 0.0037 0.0231
(0.0063) (0.0118)
Additional controls Year Year Year-country Year-country
No. of observations 5,296 1,852 4,828 1,774
No. of affiliates 1,760 582 1,561 545
R2 within 0.15 0.20 0.18 0.26
R2 between 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.03
These are estimation results for equation (6) in the text. Dependent variable is affiliate average wage. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses under coefficient estimates. The subsample of majority-owned
affiliates consists of those affiliates in which the parent firm maintains at least a 50% controlling interest. The subsample of fully owned affiliates further narrows the majority-owned subsample to consist of those
affiliates in which the parent firm maintains at least a 99% controlling interest. See text for details.
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An important concern about table 3’s fixed-effects results
may be endogeneity or measurement issues stemming from
the use of contemporaneous profits. As discussed in section
II, to allow for possible endogeneity and measurement error,
we use a generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator
that instruments for current-period profits using lagged
values of profits, all on time-differenced data to capture
affiliate effects.
Column 1 of table 4 reports GMM results estimating
equation (7) for majority-owned affiliates. This sample is
narrowed further to only fully owned affiliates in column
2. These GMM estimates provide strong support for our
international rent-sharing hypothesis. In both columns,
parent rent sharing is evident and statistically significant
at the 5% level. The implied elasticities are also larger
than in the previous fixed-effects estimates, with the fully
owned elasticity slightly larger than the majority-owned
elasticity. The Sargan test of overidentification indicates
that the instruments are valid, but the serial-correlation
test fails to reject the hypothesis of no second-order serial
correlation. These tests indicate that GMM estimation is
appropriate.
Columns 3 through 6 of table 4 add to equation (7)
the additional Zat regressors of affiliate capital intensity,
affiliate R&D intensity, and either industry-year or
country-year effects.15 Because these specifications in-
clude the largest set of controls and also instrument for
profits, they are our preferred specifications. The inter-
national rent-sharing result is again evident at standard
significance levels. The elasticities indicate that a 10%
increase in parent profitability increases affiliate wages
by between 0.3% and 0.5%.
Taken together, tables 3 and 4 show evidence that parent
profits are shared across borders with majority-owned affil-
iates, and that this profit sharing may be even stronger
among fully owned affiliates. The elasticities in these tables
are all within the range commonly found in the literature on
domestic rent sharing, between 0.006 (Christofides & Os-
wald, 1992) and approximately 0.05 (Blanchflower et al.,
1996).
What is the economic meaning and significance of our
elasticity estimates? Equation (5) from our model in
section II implies that these elasticities equal the ratio of
firms’ risk aversion to workers’ risk aversion. Thus, our
estimates mean that workers are much more risk-averse
than firms, which seems plausible. In terms of economic
significance, by our estimates a doubling of parent prof-
itability raises affiliate wages by somewhere between 1%
and 5%. If we take our average elasticity to be 0.03, then
Lester’s (1952) “range of wages” calculation implies that
the cross-section variability of parent profits explains
approximately one-fifth of the cross-section variability in
affiliate wages.16 Thus, we think that cross-border profit
sharing accounts for a substantial amount of observed
affiliate-wage variation.
earn high wages and contribute to high firm profits. We have no worker-
quality data to test this concern directly. Using Swedish data on workers
matched with firm’s balance-sheet reports, however, Arai (2003) finds that
even when controlling for a wide range of worker and occupation
characteristics, estimates indicate a profits-wages correlation of compara-
ble magnitude to those of this and other studies.
15 GMM estimation failed when using the full set of two-digit industries
reported in the data. Accordingly, we aggregated up to 19 industries, a
grouping that lies between the one-digit and two-digit NACE classifica-
tions.
16 For Lester’s (1952) range-of-wages calculation, we follow Blanch-
flower et al. (1996) and Hildreth and Oswald (1997). Assuming a distri-
bution of profits that is 4 standard deviations wide, then the range of
parent profits is roughly 1,200 (4 times 307.223 from table 2), or, relative
to the mean of 108.203, a factor of 12 times the mean. Multiplying 12 by
the elasticity of 0.03 yields a range of 36% of the mean wage stemming
from international rent sharing. The mean and standard deviation of
affiliate wages implies that the range of wages is approximately 1.6 times
the mean, which implies that profit variability can explain 0.36/1.6, or
approximately 20%, of the variability in wages.
TABLE 4.—PROFIT SHARING WITH AFFILIATE WAGES: GMM ESTIMATES
Majority-Owned
Affiliates (1)
Fully Owned
Affiliates (2)
Majority-Owned
Affiliates (3)
Fully Owned
Affiliates (4)
Majority-Owned
Affiliates (5)
Fully Owned
Affiliates (6)
Affiliate profits 0.0173 0.0202 0.0125 0.0303 0.0164 0.0246
(0.0086) (0.0093) (0.0086) (0.0126) (0.0089) (0.0100)
[Implied wage-profit elasticity] [0.0404] [0.0464] [0.0291] [0.0696] [0.0382] [0.0565]
Parent profits 0.0168 0.0187 0.0148 0.0180 0.0238 0.0228
(0.0085) (0.0048) (0.0072) (0.0045) (0.0107) (0.0048)
[Implied wage-profit elasticity] [0.0352] [0.0407] [0.0310] [0.0392] [0.0498] [0.0497]
Affiliate capital intensity 0.0006 0.0513 0.0006 0.0546
(0.0005) (0.0189) (0.0006) (0.0153)
Affiliate R&D intensity 0.0071 0.0105 0.0151 0.0084
(0.0153) (0.0091) (0.0163) (0.0098)
Additional controls Year Year Year-industry Year-industry Year-country Year-country
No. of observations 2,971 1,134 2,939 1,112 2,971 1,134
No. of affiliates 1,007 379 996 371 1,007 379
Sargan test statistic (10 dof) 12.44 18.42 14.62 18.73 12.99 16.72
Serial-correlation test statistic 1.156 1.668 0.874 1.254 1.395 1.378
These are estimation results for equation (7) in the text. Dependent variable is affiliate average wage. Standard errors are reported in parentheses under coefficient estimates. The subsample of majority-owned
affiliates consists of those affiliates in which the parent firm maintains at least a 50% controlling interest. The subsample of fully owned affiliates further narrows the majority-owned subsample to consist of those
affiliates in which the parent firm maintains at least a 99% controlling interest.
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B. Robustness Checks for Affiliate Wages
To verify the robustness of the evidence and our inter-
pretation of tables 3 and 4, we checked a number of
measurement and specification issues.
A first important issue is possible alternative explanations
for the correlation between affiliate wages and parent prof-
its. One such explanation might be intrafirm outsourcing. It
has been documented that over our sample period of the
1990s, multinational firms expanded their vertical produc-
tion networks in which parents and affiliates perform dif-
ferent activity stages linked by trade (e.g., Hanson, Mata-
loni, & Slaughter, 2001). In establishing these networks,
multinationals may relocate marginal activities from the
parents to affiliates on the basis, for example, of labor-cost
differentials. This relocation is likely to boost parent profits.
It may also boost affiliate wages, for example, if the skill
mix of affiliates rises to attract the needed workers. Thus,
our affiliate wage-parent profit correlation may reflect in-
trafirm outsourcing rather than profit sharing.
We checked this alternative explanation in three ways.
First, we simply calculated correlations between parent and
affiliate employment. If the outsourcing story predominates
in our data, then parent and affiliate employment should be
negatively correlated. Instead, in our data they are signifi-
cantly positively correlated, both in levels (correlation of
0.06) and in changes (e.g., 1-year differences correlation
of 0.04).
Second, we reestimated tables 3 and 4 adding to the Zat
regressors a direct measure of intrafirm outsourcing by
parents: the share of total multinational sales accounted for
by parent purchases of materials. Although our data cannot
separate imported from domestically sourced materials, if
outsourcing is very important, then this variable might
attenuate our affiliate-wages–parent-profits correlation of
interest. This was not the case, however: this regressor
always had a coefficient estimate not significantly different
from 0, and including it had no impact on our wages-profits
correlations (and thus the results are not reported, for
brevity).
Our third and final check on the outsourcing story was to
reestimate tables 3 and 4 but on a subsample of affiliates in
high-wage countries. If the outsourcing story predominates
in our data, then our affiliate-wages–parent-profits correla-
tion of interest should be weaker when our sample excludes
affiliates in low-wage countries—that is, affiliates in coun-
tries where outsourcing is likely more profitable. These
estimation results are reported in the Appendix, table A1,
where our excluded countries are Bulgaria, the Czech Re-
public, Hungary, Poland, Portugal, Romania, and Spain. If
anything, for this high-wage-country subsample our results
are now stronger: all four affiliate-parent elasticities are
higher than in the comparable specifications in tables 3
and 4.
Overall, we conclude from these three checks that in-
trafirm outsourcing does not explain our finding that affiliate
wages positively covary with parent profits. Instead, we
think that the evidence continues to favor our explanation of
cross-border profit sharing.
To further substantiate this explanation, our second ro-
bustness check was to split our sample of affiliates by the
competitiveness of parent industries. Our calculated profit-
sharing elasticities should be lower the more competitive
are the product markets. This is both because there may be
less profits to share (in the extreme, with perfect competi-
tion there are simply no profits to share), and also because,
for some given amount of profits, there is less marginal pass
through to wages (e.g., because in more-profitable sectors
workers have developed deeper institutions to facilitate
profit sharing, such as union contracting). If profit sharing
drives our affiliate-wages–parent-profits correlation, then
this correlation should be weaker the more competitive are
the parent industries.
To implement this test, we used data on industry five-firm
concentration ratios. For each three-digit NACE industry in
1997, these data report the fraction of sales in the EU-15
region accounted for by the largest five firms. We then chose
a critical concentration ratio of 0.15, and classified each
affiliate’s parent’s industry as highly or lowly concentrated
according as that industry’s ratio was above or below this
level. Classifying each parent’s industry in this way yielded
two subsamples of affiliates for analysis.17
Fixed-effects and GMM estimation results on these two
affiliate subsamples are reported in the Appendix, table A2.
Comparing columns 1 and 3 with columns 2 and 4, we see
that the parent-profits–affiliate-wages elasticity is approxi-
mately 5 times larger for the highly concentrated subsample
than for the lowly concentrated subsample. This difference
is largely accounted for by differences in the estimated
marginal pass-through of profits to wages, with the relevant
GMM coefficient estimate in column 3 actually not signif-
icantly different from 0 (like the affiliate-profit coefficient
estimate in that same column). These results are consistent
with the idea that profit sharing from parents to affiliates is
much stronger for highly profitable parents, and they lend
further support to our cross-border profit-sharing explana-
tion.
A third important consideration is whether parent and
industry profits are sufficiently independent to allow iden-
tification of separate wage effects of each. This may be of
particular concern for parents and affiliates classified in the
same primary industry. To allow for this possibility, we
repeated our analyses on a subsample that excluded any
affiliate observation whose primary industry was the same
17 This cutoff ratio was chosen both because it was close to the median
across industries and because it yielded affiliate subsamples of comparable
size; results are robust to slight variations in the cutoff. Our division of
parent industries accords with plausible priors: lowly concentrated indus-
tries include a wide range of textiles and apparel, and highly concentrated
industries include optical instruments and motor vehicles. For assistance
with these concentration data we thank Rene Belderbos. These data are
discussed in European Commission (2002).
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as that of its parent. Table A3 in the Appendix reports fixed
effects and GMM estimates on this subsample. The results
are qualitatively unchanged from tables 3 and 4, with
statistically significant estimates and with implied elastici-
ties in the same range as before. If anything, on balance the
parent-affiliate elasticity now looks larger.
We also performed a number of other robustness checks
that, for brevity, are not reported. One was of how we
measured profits. As discussed earlier, our profit measure
follows that of several other studies, and corresponds to the
economic concept of rents available for sharing with work-
ers. In the underlying Amadeus data, firms in some coun-
tries report accounting measures of gross profits. These may
vary across countries with differences in national account-
ing standards, or with any transfer-pricing considerations
for firms.18 The sample correlation between our profit mea-
sure and this accounting measure was over 0.9, and our
estimation results were robust to using this alternative.
Another check we tried was to use lagged rather than
contemporaneous profit measures in our fixed-effects esti-
mates. Some rent-sharing studies use lagged profit measures
to attempt to control for endogeneity concerns. We prefer
our more-structural GMM estimation to address endogene-
ity (and also to allow the interpretation of current wages
being affected by past profits), but we still tried fixed-effects
estimates using profit measures lagged 1 year. We obtained
results qualitatively similar to those reported here.
In addition to checking how we measure profits, we did
the same with wages. We have measured wages in levels,
but much of the domestic rent-sharing literature uses log
wages. We use wage levels because the theoretical motiva-
tion in section II does not necessarily imply that log wages
are related to profits, and also because the wage distribution
in our data appears more normal than log normal (unlike the
distribution of wages across people in individual-level data
sets). Nevertheless, given the prevalence of log-wage anal-
yses in the previous literature, we verified that we obtain
very similar coefficient estimates and implied elasticities
from specifications (both fixed-effects and GMM) using log
wages as the regressand.
A final check was to interact profit measures with geo-
graphic distance between the parent and affiliate countries,
and also with a dummy variable indicating adjacency of
parent and affiliate countries. It might be the case that the
extent to which multinationals share profits internally de-
pends on information flows, for which physical location
might be a proxy. We found no substantial variation in profit
sharing from distance and/or adjacency.
C. Results for Parent Wages
Having established parent-to-affiliate rent sharing, we
next reverse focus to look for evidence of affiliate-to-parent
rent sharing. As discussed in section II, in principle the
international aspects of wage setting could be symmetrical.
Just as affiliate workers might risk-share over parent prof-
itability, so, too, might parent workers risk-share over affil-
iate profitability.
To look for covariation in parent wages and affiliate
profits, we reconfigure our panel from affiliate-year obser-
vations to parent-year observations. In this reconfigured
panel, each parent in each year can have any number of
foreign affiliates. One way to treat this multiaffiliate aspect
of our data would be to treat each parent-affiliate-year
combination as a separate observation. An alternative would
be to average the profitability of all affiliates for each
parent-year observation. We tried both methods and ob-
tained qualitatively similar results either way. For brevity,
we report results for just the latter approach, where profits
per worker across all affiliates are averaged using affiliate
sales as weights. Given the suggestive evidence in earlier
tables that parents share profits more strongly with affiliates
the larger the ownership stake, we also tried averaging
affiliate profitability using only majority-owned and then
only fully owned affiliates.
Table 5 reports baseline fixed-effects and GMM estimates
of equations (6) and (7) for parent wages on both parent and
affiliate profits per worker. Fixed-effects estimates are in
columns 1 and 2. GMM estimates are in columns 3 and 4;
as with the earlier GMM estimates, we instrument for parent
and affiliate profits using their lagged values and other
regressors. As indicated, each column uses a different set of
affiliates for each parent-year observation for constructing
affiliate profitability.19 The standard domestic rent-sharing
result is evident in the significantly positive correlation
between parent profitability and parent wages, with the
implied wage-profits elasticity of approximately 0.02. How-
ever, table 5 shows no evidence of international rent shar-
ing: the coefficient estimates on affiliate profitability are all
close to 0 with low t-statistics. We obtained very similar
(unreported) results for specifications that added additional
18 Transfer pricing is the practice whereby multinationals can manipulate
reported profits of parents and affiliates by choosing the prices used to
record intrafirm transfers of (e.g.) intellectual property. Many countries’
tax laws explicitly try to minimize this practice, but to the extent that it
occurs, the measured parent and affiliate profits may differ from the true
values. Our constructed profit measure may be less prone to transfer-
pricing concerns than are accounting profits, but it may still raise transfer-
pricing issues, for example, if firms manipulate intrafirm input prices. In
addition, our various fixed effects may control for important dimensions of
transfer pricing: for example, affiliate effects capture firm strategies and
time-invariant host-country tax laws, and year-country effects capture
changes in tax laws. And our GMM specifications with instruments may
remove any spurious profit variation due to transfer pricing. That said, we
think this practice may bias us away from finding our link of interest
between parent profits and affiliate wages. If positive shocks to affiliate
wages lower true affiliate profits, then multinationals may have more
scope to transfer true parent profits to the affiliate. This will tend to lower
measured parent profits, and thus impart a negative correlation between
affiliate wages and measured parent profits.
19 GMM estimates are reported for calculations of affiliate profits using
all affiliates and just majority-owned affiliates (similar calculations using
just fully owned affiliates yielded less-reliable GMM estimates, due to the
reduced number of observations). The diagnostics of the Sargan and
serial-correlation tests indicate these GMM equations are well specified.
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regressors; that treated all parent-affiliate-year observations
separately, as described above; or that dropped from the
initial sample affiliates that were small relative to parents.
Based on the results in table 5, we find no evidence that
affiliate profits are shared with parent workers. This lack of
profit sharing from affiliates to parent workers may reflect a
number of issues. For example, if affiliates are very small
relative to parents, and/or are minority owned and thus
perhaps not known, then wage setting in parents may simply
ignore affiliate activity. We consider this to be an area for
future research.
V. Conclusions
The large literature on profit sharing is almost exclusively
focused within single countries. Against a backdrop of
increased globalization, in this paper we construct and
examine a unique firm-level panel to examine whether
profits are shared across borders within multinational firms
for a wide array of industries and countries.
Our central finding is a positive, statistically significant
relationship between parent profits per worker and foreign
wages in majority and fully owned affiliates. This relation-
ship is robust to a number of specification and estimation
choices, including using GMM estimation to address pos-
sible endogeneity and measurement issues. Our estimates of
the profit elasticity of wages vary between approximately
0.01 and 0.05, which falls in the range estimated by the
domestic profit-sharing literature. If we take our average
elasticity to be 0.03, then the cross-section variability of
parent profits explains approximately one-fifth of the cross-
section variability in affiliate wages.
Our results are an important addition to the literature on
rent sharing. Future work might try to establish similar
results for different samples of multinationals—for exam-
ple, those with greater geographic spread than our Europe-
only data. Equally importantly, our results document impor-
tant effects of globalization on local economic outcomes.
This carries important implications for both policy and
theory, and underscores the increasingly global nature of
labor markets. For example, international rent sharing may
help explain why multinational affiliates tend to pay higher
wages than do purely domestic firms.
Finally, we believe our findings are relevant for the
international macro literature on real business cycles and
correlated international movements in macro aggregates.
This literature has focused on the transmission of national
income shocks through explicit risk sharing in international
capital markets. Our findings suggest an additional link-
age—international profit sharing between parents and affil-
iates in multinational firms—that can transmit economic
conditions across national borders. In the labor literature,
one standard explanation for rent sharing in a domestic
context is implicit risk sharing between firms and workers.
Our findings suggest that risk sharing across countries can
also occur implicitly through multinational firms.
In our data, the average within-firm standard deviation of
parent profits is 34.5. Within-firm profits therefore vary year
to year by an average of 30%. Our central wage-parent
profits elasticity of 0.03 then implies that average year-to-
year variation in parent profits causes affiliate wages to vary
by nearly 1% each year. Considering that average annual
wage growth is often less than 5%, a 1% change that stems
solely from variability in parent profitability in a foreign
country is striking. This back-of-the-envelope calculation
suggests that international rent sharing is sufficiently strong
for its implications to extend beyond understanding individ-
ual wage outcomes. Future work in labor economics, inter-
national economics, and macroeconomics might benefit
from incorporating this phenomenon.
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APPENDIX
TABLE A1.—PROFIT SHARING WITH AFFILIATE WAGES, AFFILIATES IN ONLY HIGH-WAGE COUNTRIES: FIXED EFFECTS AND GMM ESTIMATES
Majority-Owned
Affiliates (1)
Fully Owned
Affiliates (2)
Majority-Owned
Affiliates (3)
Fully Owned
Affiliates (4)
Affiliate profits 0.0023 0.0210 0.0727 0.0226
(0.0010) (0.0040) (0.0120) (0.0040)
[Implied wage-profit elasticity] [0.0063] [0.0420] [0.1600] [0.0488]
Parent profits 0.0045 0.0100 0.0249 0.0212
(0.0010) (0.0030) (0.0100) (0.0029)
[Implied wage-profit elasticity] [0.0087] [0.0210] [0.0447] [0.0412]
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 2,711 938 1,536 557
No. of affiliates 892 296 519 185
R2 within 0.19 0.27
R2 between 0.01 0.03
Sargan test statistic (10 dof) 12.03 12.74
Serial-correlation test statistic 1.792 1.777
Columns 1 and 2 and columns 3 and 4, respectively, report estimation results for equations (6) and (7) in the text. Dependent variable is affiliate average wage. Standard errors are reported in parentheses under
coefficient estimates (robust for columns 1 and 2). The subsample of high-wage countries excludes affiliates in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Portugal, Romania, and Spain. The subsample of
majority-owned affiliates consists of those affiliates in which the parent firm maintains at least a 50% controlling interest. The subsample of fully owned affiliates further narrows the majority-owned subsample to
consist of those affiliates in which the parent firm maintains at least a 99% controlling interest. See text for details.
TABLE A2.—PROFIT SHARING WITH AFFILIATE WAGES, PARENTS IN LOWLY VERSUS HIGHLY CONCENTRATED SECTORS: FIXED EFFECTS AND GMM ESTIMATES
Lowly Concen.
Sectors (1)
Highly Concen.
Sectors (2)
Lowly Concen.
Sectors (3)
Highly Concen.
Sectors (4)
Affiliate profits 0.0047 0.0020 0.0007 0.0319
(0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0090) (0.0040)
[Implied wage-profit elasticity] [0.0130] [0.0050] [0.0010] [0.0700]
Parent profits 0.0024 0.0167 0.0040 0.0200
(0.0010) (0.0040) (0.0100) (0.0040)
[Implied wage-profit elasticity] [0.0060] [0.0320] [0.0080] [0.0400]
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 2,910 2,386 1,675 1,505
No. of affiliates 1,003 757 574 500
R2 within 0.15 0.15
R2 between 0.03 0.01
Sargan test statistic (10 dof) 7.2 17.60
Serial-correlation test statistic 0.282 0.849
Columns 1 and 2 and columns 3 and 4, respectively, report estimation results for equations (6) and (7) in the text. Dependent variable is affiliate average wage. Standard errors are reported in parentheses under
coefficient estimates (robust for columns 1 and 2). The two subsamples by industry concentration classify each affiliate based on the industry of its parent, using data on EU-wide industry sales. All columns are
based on the subsample of majority-owned affiliates, which consists of those affiliates in which the parent firm maintains at least a 50% controlling interest. See text for details.
TABLE A3.—PROFIT SHARING WITH AFFILIATE WAGES, AFFILIATES AND PARENTS IN DIFFERENT INDUSTRIES: FIXED EFFECTS AND GMM ESTIMATES
Majority-Owned
Affiliates (1)
Fully Owned
Affiliates (2)
Majority-Owned
Affiliates (3)
Fully Owned
Affiliates (4)
Affiliate profits 0.0023 0.0163 0.0168 0.0124
(0.0008) (0.0028) (0.0066) (0.0050)
[Implied wage-profit elasticity] [0.0064] [0.0331] [0.0392] [0.0285]
Parent profits 0.0041 0.0175 0.0122 0.0219
(0.0017) (0.0031) (0.0055) (0.0054)
[Implied wage-profit elasticity] [0.0085] [0.0325] [0.0256] [0.0477]
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 3,711 1,251 1,643 722
No. of affiliates 1,261 409 557 241
R2 within 0.16 0.27
R2 between 0.01 0.02
Sargan test statistic (10 dof) 16.91 14.57
Serial-correlation test statistic 1.123 0.508
Columns 1 and 2 and columns 3 and 4, respectively, report estimation results for equations (6) and (7) in the text. Dependent variable is affiliate average wage. Standard errors are reported in parentheses under
coefficient estimates (robust for columns 1 and 2). This subsample excludes any affiliate observation whose primary industry is the same as that of its parent. The subsample of majority-owned affiliates consists
of those affiliates in which the parent firm maintains at least a 50% controlling interest. The subsample of fully owned affiliates further narrows the majority-owned subsample to consist of those affiliates in which
the parent firm maintains at least a 99% controlling interest. See text for details.
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